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by
ROBERT DALTON BRYANT
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ABSTRACT

This study examines how the economic elite of Florence, Italy during the fifteenth century exerted
political control over the Republic of Florence. Several powerful families influenced the domestic and
foreign policies of Florence. However, one Florentine family among the ruling class was more effective at
using their wealth to obtain political power. As this work demonstrates, the Medici family was able to
control the republican Florentine government as a de facto plutocracy. Chapter two focuses on how the
Medici successfully used civic humanism and artistic endeavors to justify and project their power
throughout the Italian world. Focusing on contemporary demographic, literary, and legal sources,
including the Tratte of Office Holders, 1282–1532 and the Catasto of 1427 in chapter three, this thesis
illustrates how the Medici, in particular Cosimo Pater Patriae (Father of the Fatherland) and his grandson
Lorenzo, manipulated the Republic of Florence to maintain their control over the Florentine government.
Chapter three details the manipulative practices of Cosimo de’ Medici and Lorenzo de’ Medici that
highlight the Florentine government’s lack of republican values. Finally, chapter four utilizes the Catasto
of 1427 to illustrate who the plutocratic class was and shows how the Medici used their wealth more
effectively. The example given in chapter four is how the Medici used their wealth to influence religious
appointments in the Catholic Church.
INDEX WORDS: Plutocracy, Cosimo de’ Medici, Lorenzo de’ Medici, Quattrocento, Republic of
Florence, Civic Humanism, Catasto of 1427, Electoral Manipulation, Leonardo Bruni
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
The economic elite of a society has a vested interest in the political proceedings of the domain in
which they live. This concern arose among the wealthy because of the effect governments and political
entities can have on their moneymaking enterprises. However, given the right set of circumstances, that
personal stake in society can evolve into considerable influence or even outright control over the political
process. During the fifteenth century, the wealthiest individuals of Florence, Italy, exhibited significant
influence over their political body, the Republic of Florence. The fifteenth-century Florentine economic
elite was able to exact so much political control that they created a plutocracy over the supposedly
republican government. Among the wealthiest of members of Florentine society during the Quattrocento
was one family that was able to use its wealth and status to manipulate the republican government more
effectively than any other. This family, the Medici, exemplified the Florentine plutocracy through their
domination of Florence’s political landscape, beginning with their ascension to power in 1434.
The family’s domination of Florentine society can be attributed to several important factors.
However, none of their success could have been possible without the vast wealth accumulated from the
Medici banking empire. Arguably better than most of their contemporaries, the Medici understood and
exploited the value of civic humanistic works and artistic endeavors in order to increase their political
influence. In addition, the family was able to expertly exploit the Florentine political system to further
consolidate their political control. This included the republican governmental processes, like elections that
were vulnerable to manipulation by entities such as the Medici. The three chapters of this thesis will focus
on each of the factors contributing to the Medici’s ability to control the Republic of Florence. In doing so,
this thesis will illustrate that the Republic of Florence was, in fact, a plutocracy that the Medici family
was able to rule through their projection of power, political exploitation, and strategically invested wealth.
Some of the terms used throughout the work have either obscure definitions, multiple meanings, or
meanings that have changed over time. Because of the fluid nature of these terms’ definitions, it is
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necessary to establish precise meanings of the terms so they can be used effectively in the work’s lines of
argumentation without the risk of misinterpretation. The first of these terms that is crucial to the overall
work and requires a clear definition is plutocracy. The word plutocracy can be defined as “a government
in which the wealthy rule and govern,” or as a reference to any particular wealthy group that “control[s]
or influence[s]” a governmental body.1 Both of these definitions accurately represents how the term is
used throughout this work and offers a concise description of the activities of those at the helm of the
Republic of Florence during the fifteenth century. The application of the term plutocracy to this
government is arguably anachronistic. Yet, the origin of the term can be traced back to ancient Greece
and historians such as Xenophon, who used the term to describe such governments.2
A term that scholars often use to describe the government of Florence during the Quattrocento is
oligarchy. This word does not provide the best historical interpretation of the nature of the Republic of
Florence during this time. In its simplest terms, an oligarchy is a “government ruled by a small group of
powerful people.”3 As Niccolo Machiavelli asserts in his Discourses on Livy (1531), a government ruled
by a small group is an evolution of the aristocracy.4 Mark Jurdjevic refers to this evolution in the

1

Elizabeth Mohn, “Plutocracy,” Salem Press Encyclopedia, (Hackensack, NJ: Salem Press,

2019), accessed March 3, 2020,
https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&AuthType=ip,shib&db=ers&AN=119214114.

2

Jeffrey A. Winters, Oligarchy, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 27.

3

Mohn, “Plutocracy,” Salem Press Encyclopedia, 2019.

4

Niccolò Machiavelli, Discourses on Livy, trans. Harvey C. Mansfield and Nathan

Tarcov (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996), 11.
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Republic of Florence’s governmental ideology during the late fourteenth and fifteenth centuries as
“oligarchic republicanism.”5 The question that needs to be asked when describing this small group is, how
did they obtain their power and with what power did they rule? As the thesis will demonstrate, an
essential characteristic of those in control of the Republic of Florence during the fifteenth century was
their wealth and how they were able to utilize it for political ends. Due to the importance of wealth in
describing the ruling class of Florence during the fifteenth century, plutocracy is the more apt term to
describe the elite few who controlled the Republic of Florence.
The next important word that requires clarification is republic. Given that this political form of
government has existed in one form or another dating back to the ancient Greek city-states, its usage can
be quite vague unless explicitly defined.6 As Quentin Skinner asserted in his first volume of The
Foundations of Modern Political Thought, a republic in fifteenth-century Florentine terms can be defined
as a government “where the citizens, the townspeople and the community select their own” rulers instead
of one where rulers are forced upon the people like monarchies.7 This definition highlights the difference
between the ability to choose a leader through an election process versus the absence of that ability. J. G.

5

Mark Jurdjevic, “Civic Humanism and the Rise of the Medici,” Renaissance Quarterly 52, no. 4

(1999): 996. doi:10.2307/2901833.

6

“Republicanism,” Salem Press Encyclopedia, (Hackensack, NJ: Salem Press, 2019),

https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&AuthType=ip,shib&db=ers&AN=133861016.

7

Quentin Skinner, The Foundations of Modern Political Thought: Volume 1 (Cambridge:

Cambridge University Press, 1978), 42.
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A. Pocock says in The Machiavellian Moment that for the Florentine republican ideal to succeed, its
citizens must actively participate in the governmental system (vivere civile).8
However, this description can lead one to draw the wrong conclusion as to what the participation in
government meant in fifteenth-century Florence. The participation of the electorate in the Republic of
Florence cannot be conflated with that of modern-day republics like that United States. For example, in
Florence during the fifteenth century, citizenship was defined in relation to guild membership, which
required one to be proficient at a trade. As a result, only an estimated five thousand citizens (out of a
population of 50,000 to 70,000) could participate in Florence’s political process during the Quattrocento.9
This connection to guild membership essentially meant that a very small portion of the population was
able to select their chosen leaders, from which an even smaller group would actually fill one of those
leadership positions. As Yves Sintomer points out, the Republic of Florence was “not self-government by
all,” but instead government in which power was consolidated among a few select individuals.10 While

8

J. G. A. Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic

Republican Tradition (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2016), 56–57.

9

Yves Sintomer. “Random Selection, Republican Self-Government, and Deliberative

Democracy,” Constellations: An International Journal of Critical & Democratic Theory 17, no. 3
(September 2010), 476. doi:10.1111/j.1467–8675.2010.00607.x.; Richard A. Goldthwaite, The Economy
of Renaissance Florence (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009), 521.

10

Yves Sintomer, “Random Selection, Republican Self–Government, and Deliberative

Democracy,” Constellations: An International Journal of Critical & Democratic Theory 17, no. 3
(September 2010): 476, doi:10.1111/j.1467–8675.2010.00607.x.
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this republican government did not represent all of the people of Florence and was flawed in other ways
that the thesis will discuss, republics were still seen by humanists as preferable to tyranny, and therefore
worth defending.11
The last term which needs further clarification is civic humanism, which can be defined in a
simplified form as an intellectual movement that valued ideals like political freedoms and civic
participation in a representative government. While civic humanism will be described more in-depth later
on in the thesis, there is a large controversy surrounding the term, which is too broad in scope to be
comprehensively covered in this introduction. Nevertheless, the term’s controversy should be addressed
because of civic humanism’s importance to this thesis. Hans Baron, the historian who introduced the
term, came to a conclusion in The Crisis of the Early Italian Renaissance: Civic Humanism and Liberty in
an Age of Classicism and Tyranny that has come under scrutiny by subsequent academics.12 When
describing the philosophical basis of who the civic humanists were, as well as the origin of the movement,
Baron insisted that the formation of civic humanism occurred in Florence in 1402.13 However, this
specific time and place Baron attributed to the beginning of civic humanism has since been challenged in
the academic community. A large group of reputable scholars, including Nicolai Rubinstein and Quentin

11

Skinner, The Foundations of Modern Political Thought: Volume 1, 42.

12

Hans Baron, The Crisis of the Early Italian Renaissance: Civic Humanism and Liberty in an

Age of Classicism and Tyranny, Rev. ed. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966).

13

James Hankins, “The ‘Baron Thesis’ after Forty Years and Some Recent Studies of Leonardo

Bruni,” Journal of the History of Ideas56, no. 2 (1995): 315, doi:10.2307/2709840.

10
Skinner, cited evidence revealing that characteristics Baron attributed to civic humanists occurred in
different Italian city-states before 1402.14
Despite these issues, the term is still used today in historical examinations of the Italian
Renaissance. This is because the dating Hans Baron used in his argumentation may have had issues, but
not all the conclusions he reached regarding civic humanism were problematic. As a professor of history
at Cornell University John M. Najemy asserts, “recent work has by and large confirmed Baron’s view[s]”
on civic humanism’s “distinctive” cultural and political perspective as well as its overall influence on the
Italian Renaissance.15 James Hankins echoed this sentiment by stating that Baron’s view on “civic
humanism retains a core of validity,” and for this reason, the term is still used in current academic
literature.16
Both Najemy and Hankins assert that despite his research flaws, Baron’s analysis of what he
coined as civic humanism still has value in historical research. While there has been a significant
advancement in the study of the civic humanists and a disregard for Baron’s periodization errors, much of
the current research focusing on civic humanism stems from Baron’s work in the twentieth century. This

14

Hankins, “The ‘Baron Thesis’ after Forty Years and Some Recent Studies of Leonardo

Bruni,” 315–316.

15

John M. Najemy, review of In Search of Florentine Civic Humanism: Essays on the Transition

from Medieval to Modern Thought by Hans Baron, Renaissance Quarterly 45, no. 2 (1992): 341,
doi:10.2307/2862752.

16

Hankins, “The “Baron Thesis” after Forty Years and Some Recent Studies of Leonardo

Bruni,” 330.
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brief explanation is necessary because this work contains a chapter that heavily references current works
on the subject of civic humanism and proper care must be taken to avoid the issues that plagued the work
of Hans Baron. It should be noted that the sentiment about the active public life was a key characteristic
of the republican political philosophy of civic humanism.17 This, as well as how civic humanism was used
by the economic elite, is why the term so crucial to the overall argument of the thesis.
The second chapter of this work, titled Civic Humanism and the Arts, focuses on the Medici
family’s utilization of civic humanistic literature and artistic endeavors that facilitated their control over
Florentine society during the Quattrocento. First, civic humanist literature that supported the rule of the
Medici, like Leonardo Bruni’s History of the Florentine People (1442), is examined in detail.18 Further
context regarding ways in which the works of humanists such as Bruni, and the manner by which elites
like the Medici used such works to justify their rule, can be found in the works of Quentin Skinner.19
Bruni’s work was used by the elite ruling class of fifteenth-century Florence to justify the limitations
placed on the size of the electorate, particularly after the Ciompi Revolt. In addition to Bruni’s own work,
secondary sources such as Yves Winter’s “Plebeian Politics: Machiavelli and the Ciompi Uprising” will

17

Lauro Martines, The Social World of the Florentine Humanists, 1390–1460 (Toronto:

University of Toronto Press, 2015), 9.

18

Leonardo Bruni, History of the Florentine People. Memoirs, trans. by James Hankins, Vol. 3

(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007).

19

Quentin Skinner, The Foundations of Modern Political Thought: Volume 1 (Cambridge:

Cambridge University Press, 1978); Quentin Skinner, Visions of Politics: Volume 2, Renaissance Virtues
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).
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be used to bolster the argument of the chapter by establishing how the Ciompi Revolt changed the face of
Florentine politics in the fifteenth century.20 This chapter then explores how Cosimo and Lorenzo de’
Medici used art to project their political power not only to citizens but also to other political leaders. This
includes the use of Dale V. Kent’s work Cosimo De’ Medici and the Florentine Renaissance: The
Patron’s Oeuvre and to accomplish the same goal for Lorenzo, the works of F.W. Kent show how he used
architecture to project power. The third chapter, entitled Politics and Medici Manipulation, highlights the
institutional structures governing the Republic of Florence during the Quattrocento and the ways the
Medici were able to manipulate these structures for their own gain. To understand how the Florentine
government could be used by a powerful family like the Medici, the thesis will detail how parts of the
system of government functioned, and the areas that were most vulnerable to manipulation. For example,
the process by which government officials were elected required a random selection from leather pouches
called borse, which had procedural steps that could manipulate the outcome.21
Through the examination of the Medici’s manipulation of the elections of the republican
government during the fifteenth century, this thesis will demonstrate how the family under Cosimo, and
later Lorenzo, was able to consolidate so much political power. The Medici family’s accumulation of
political power supports the overall assertion that the Republic of Florence was, in fact, subject to
plutocratic rule during the Quattrocento. To illustrate how the Medici family participated in the Republic
of Florence, the Tratte of Office Holders database compiled by professors in conjunction with Brown

20

Yves Winter, “Plebeian Politics: Machiavelli and the Ciompi Uprising,” Political Theory 40,

no. 6 (2012): 737, accessed March 4, 2020.

21

Yves Sintomer, “Random Selection, Republican Self–Government, and Deliberative

Democracy,” 476, doi:10.1111/j.1467–8675.2010.00607.x.

13
University will demonstrate what political offices the family held.22 The fourth chapter of the thesis, The
Economic Reality of the Plutocracy, will consist of an assessment of who comprised the plutocracy of
fifteenth-century Florence as well as an analysis of the Medici bank and how they used their wealth to
control Florentine society.
For information regarding the general economic reality of Florence during the fifteenth century,
Richard Goldthwaite’s The Economy of Renaissance Florence will be consulted.23 To properly establish a
plutocratic ruling class, there must be an accurate evaluation of the wealth of the elite members of
Florence during the Quattrocento. This plutocratic class will be defined using a variety of sources,
including the Catasto of 1427, which provides tax records from Florence during the early fifteenth
century.24 This particular tax record was chosen because it provides the most panoramic and varied
assessment of the Florentine citizens’ wealth in relation to later Florentine catasto tax records.25 As

22

Florentine Renaissance Resources, Online Tratte of Office Holders, 1282–1532. Machine

readable data file. Edited by David Herlihy, R. Burr Litchfield, Anthony Molho, and Roberto
Barducci. (Florentine Renaissance Resources/STG: Brown University, Providence, R. I., 2002.)

23

Richard A. Goldthwaite, The Economy of Renaissance Florence (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins

University Press, 2009).

24

Online Catasto of 1427. Version 1.3. Edited by David Herlihy, Christiane Klapisch-Zuber, R.

Burr Litchfield and Anthony Molho. [Machine readable data file based on D. Herlihy and C. KlapischZuber, Census and Property Survey of Florentine Domains in the Province of Tuscany, 1427–1480.]
Florentine Resources/STG: Brown University, Providence. R.I., 2002.

25

Ibid.
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Richard Goldthwaite asserted, the Catasto of 1427 is “the most thorough economic survey of any
European city before the nineteenth century.”26 Combined with its online availability, this tax record has a
depth of economic information that is ideal for the purpose of this research.
Richard Goldthwaite’s Private Wealth in Renaissance Florence: A Study of Four Families provides
another source that examines the wealth of four private families across generations in the fifteenth and
sixteenth centuries.27 The Medici Bank, which provided the financial backing for the Medici political
domination of the Quattrocento, clearly illustrates the connection between wealth and political control
among the plutocracy. Raymond de Roover’s works offer insight into the structure of the enterprise that
allowed for the Medici’s wealth.28 These sources help establish how the Medici obtained their great
wealth, and how the Medici chose to use their wealth to buy influence in the church. Use of these sources
helps explain why the family was able to rule over the Republic of Florence. Indeed, the Medici’s
influence within the Catholic Church can be traced to the papacy itself, as the family served as the Pope’s

26

Goldthwaite, The Economy of Renaissance Florence, xiv.

27

Richard A. Goldthwaite, Private Wealth in Renaissance Florence: a Study of Four Families

(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1968).

28

Raymond de Roover, The Medici Bank: Its Organization, Management, Operations, and

Decline (New York, NY: New York University Press, 1948); and Raymond De Roover, The Rise and
Decline of the Medici Bank: 1397–1494 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1963).
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bankers during their political dominance over Florence.29 The Medici infiltration into religious matters
such as these illustrates another way the family used their wealth to gain societal control.
Through the use of these and other sources, this thesis demonstrates that fifteenth-century Florence
did not have a republican government but instead had a plutocracy. Not only was the city-state of
Florence a plutocracy, but this plutocracy masquerading as a republic was controlled by the Medici
banking family during most of the Quattrocento. However, this feat could not have been accomplished
without the realization of several crucial components of the Medici’s strategy for societal control in the
fifteenth century. This includes the use of civic humanism as well as artistic endeavors to garner political
influence, their manipulation of important processes and institutions governing the Republic of Florence,
and their amassing of great wealth via the vast banking empire of the Medici family. Each of these points
is discussed at length in their respective chapters to support the overall conclusion: the Medici ruled over
fifteenth-century Florence as plutocratic rulers and not as paragons of republican virtue.

29

George Holmes, “How the Medici Became the Pope’s Bankers,” in Florentine Studies: Politics

and Society in Renaissance Florence, ed. Nicolai Rubinstein (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University
Press, 1968).
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CHAPTER 2
CIVIC HUMANISM AND THE ARTS
Civic humanism had an inescapable effect on the political landscape of the Republic of Florence
during the Quattrocento. This political philosophy advocated for the preservation of republics through
active participation in the government and utilization of the larger humanist movement’s principles. The
Republic of Florence (1115–1532) was a government influenced by humanism, as is revealed through an
examination of the wealthy citizens involved in that government. However, the plutocratic domination
that the Medici banking family exerted over the republican government in the mid-to-late fifteenth
century leads to questions regarding the commitment of the civic humanists to preserving republics. The
civic humanist belief in safeguarding republics coexisted in a complicated relationship with the practice
of ceding greater representative power to that of a plutocracy. This neglect of an ideal that was so
important to their philosophy can be connected to the power and influence of the Medici family beginning
in 1434.1
Arguably the most important patriarch in the history of the banking family, Cosimo de’ Medici
(1389–1464), was able to use not only his financial power but also his contemporary civic humanists and
their political philosophy to help make himself the most important man in Florence during his time. While
Cosimo certainly had a genuine interest in their work, his patronage of these humanists served another,
more public purpose: creating an image of himself as a powerful individual who could lead Florence as a
scholarly politician. Cosimo and his son Lorenzo de’ Medici (1449–1492), as well as the rest of the
plutocratic elite, also used the patronage of artistic endeavors to solidify their image of power. Whether it
was paintings, sculpture, or even monumental architecture, Renaissance Florentine patronage of the arts
offered elite families the opportunity to project their power to an audience. The Medici were able to use

1

Cecilia M. Ady, Lorenzo Dei Medici and Renaissance Italy (London: English Universities

Press, 1970), 9.
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their artistic patronage to convey the image of virtuous humanist leaders who were clearly in control of
Florence during the Quattrocento, whatever their legal status might have actually been. Ultimately, the
Medici family’s control over the Republic of Florence cannot be properly understood without examining
the use of art, the patronage of art, and the employment of civic humanism to project their “social
status.”2
The philosophical concept of civic humanism is initially difficult to define outside of merely
referring to it as the “application of humanism in a public or semipublic situation.”3 To understand this
philosophy and how it contributed to the political landscape of fifteenth-century Florence, it is necessary
to understand what the humanists of the time aimed to achieve. While there are slight variations in the
ideas presented by individual civic humanists, the scholars Quentin Skinner and J. G. A. Pocock have
identified a clear system of intellectual principles that these learned individuals believed should be used in
political engagement. The work that individuals such as Leonardo Bruni (1370–1444) and Niccolò
Machiavelli (1469–1527) created not only sheds light on this political ideology but also helps frame what
civic humanism was, and how the political elite used it during the Quattrocento.
One of the more pervasive ideas in Florentine civic humanism during the fifteenth century was
the notion that republican forms of government were volatile in nature and needed to be guarded against
nefarious forces. This notion was no mere philosophical conjecture for the Florentines in the late
fourteenth and fifteenth century; it had tangible implications. For instance, humanist Leonardo Bruni

2

Brian Maxson, The Humanist World of Renaissance Florence (Cambridge: Cambridge

University Press, 2014), 84.

3

Ibid, 83.
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recounts in his work History of the Florentine People (1442) the events of the Visconti-led Milanese
invasion, which devastated “the countryside around Florence” in 1351.4
In this instance, the militaristic Duchy of Milan posed a clear threat to the republican city-state of
Florence, and control of Florence was crucial to the Milanese goal of uniting the peninsula under Visconti
control. The very fact that Florence’s government was republican in nature made Bruni argue that its
preservation meant a net result of greater freedom for humanity. Bruni would contend that Florence was
“the defender of Tuscan liberty” from tyrannical threats like Milan.5 This veneration could be interpreted
to mean Bruni believed that republican institutions, like the one in his native Florence, were without fault
and benefitted all of humanity. However, his writings suggest that he understood the flaws within
republics, like the factionalism of political groups and corruption, but thought that despite all these
factors, it presented the best form of governance.6 Bruni’s History reaffirms the Florentine civic humanist
ideal of protecting republican forms of government. This staunch defense of republicanism was crafted by
a master rhetorician.7 This does not mean Leonardo Bruni intended his argument to be deceptive; instead,
it was a polished argument presented with sound logic.

4

Gary Ianziti, “Leonardo Bruni, the Medici, and Florentine Histories,” Journal of the History of

Ideas 69, no. 1 (2008), 5.

5

Mikael Hörnqvist, “The Two Myths of Civic Humanism,” in Renaissance Civic Humanism:

Reappraisals and Reflections, ed. James Hankins (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 2000, 117.

6

Donald J. Wilcox, The Development of Florentine Humanist Historiography in the Fifteenth

Century (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1969), 72.

7

Arthur Field, “Leonardo Bruni, Florentine Traitor? Bruni, the Medici, and an Aretine

Conspiracy of 1437,” Renaissance Quarterly 51, no. 4 (1998): 1110, doi:10.2307/2901962
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Another manner by which a republic can be attacked is from within, as the members of the
Florentine city-state did when they disagreed over the issue of proper representation. The fourteenthcentury event that attacked Florence’s republican government from within and changed the city-state’s
political future is called the Ciompi Revolt (1378–1382). While this particular worker’s rebellion has
many complex details, it can be summarized as a group of “hired, propertyless workers” in the wool (and
other) guilds who fought for greater representation utilizing violent actions.8 This major labor dispute had
clear political implications for the Republic of Florence in terms of who would be allowed to hold public
office in the government. If a non-guildsman could hold elected office, then residents would play a larger
role in the governmental process instead of the stranglehold the elite of Florence had on the city-state’s
political fate. These individuals who sought greater representation managed to install a “revolutionary
regime” for a brief time, which ultimately fell.9 Nevertheless, this instilled concern in the ruling
Florentine elites about the power of the lower classes.10
It might seem odd that a failed, short-lived government would cause such powerful families in
Florentine politics to be afraid of losing their command over the government. However, seeing this
potential regime’s success with the backing of the people in Florence, the city’s elite families’ fear of
losing their power was indeed warranted. The laborers’ demands seemed to the elite individuals in control

8

Lauro Martines, Power and Imagination: City–States in Renaissance Italy (New York: Knopf,

1979), 136; Niccolò Machiavelli, The Florentine History, trans. Ninian Hill Thomson, (London:
Archibald Constable and Co. Limited, 1906), 187–188.

9

Yves Winter, “Plebeian Politics: Machiavelli and the Ciompi Uprising,” Political Theory 40, no.

6 (2012): 737.

10

Ibid.
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of Florence to be an effort to disrupt “the social order.”11 Whether or not this accurately depicts the
demands of this worker’s rebellion is of no consequence, because the issue is the perception of the ruling
class of Florence at the time of the revolt. This ruling class is the same group that regained power after the
brief tenure of the regime established by the revolt ended. This fear of losing power explains why these
laborers were ultimately “excluded from government,” and why the new guilds that the revolutionary
government installed were disbanded, once the elite regained control.12
While there is extensive scholarship on the Ciompi Revolt, one way the historical record shows
that the elite of Florence considered this political revolt very dangerous and important is through
humanistic writings. There was quick and decisive action taken in response to the revolt, like the
government’s effort to quell the riots and keep “the city united.”13 Reflecting on the events of 1378–1382
in History of the Florentine People, Leonardo Bruni disparaged the Ciompi Revolt as a misguided and
immoral rebellion on the part of the workers.14 Bruni’s unfavorable retelling of the events of the revolt
can be understood as the voices of the Florentine elite not only because he had wealthy patrons financially
supporting him but also because of his own high social standing. For instance, in his work History of the
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Florentine People, Bruni describes those behind the revolt as “impoverished criminals” who sought
“plunder, slaughter, and the exile of citizens.”15 This reiterates the fact that the Ciompi Revolt greatly
affected the perspective of the elite ruling class on representation in the republican government. From
Bruni’s perspective, this incident shifted the style of republican government in the fifteenth century to a
more centralized form of control in which a few individuals had a large portion of power.
Leonardo Bruni stated that this Trecento revolt was a challenge to the stability of the Republic of
Florence; he described these rebelling workers in the language of fear and derision. By attributing the
motive of revenge against the “tradition[al] elite” to these individuals, Bruni portrayed their actions as
dangerous to the strength of the Republic of Florence.16 It should be noted that Bruni was one of the most
important humanists of his time who “paved the way” for the work of other humanists, including
translations of ancient texts.17 Therefore, Bruni’s thoughts on this subject should be considered important
among the views of fifteenth-century humanists. The lens through which Bruni viewed the republican
government is a demonstration of how Italian humanists generally thought about republican governments.
His concerns about the integrity of such governments were echoed by contemporaries and later
Florentines, including Niccolò Machiavelli.
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As Machiavelli asserted in Il Principe (1532) and Discorsi sopra la Prima Deca di Tito Livio
(1531), every individual and group needs to “be kept entirely free from subjection” if the goal is to
prevent the collapse of the republic.18 As with many concepts Machiavelli conveyed, this statement
provides an insight into politics that seems obvious in hindsight. He understood that if anyone felt
slighted within a republican form of government, those individuals would potentially seek to rebalance
said government. The remedy that the “father of modern political science” offers is another idea prevalent
in the political philosophy of civic humanism: engagement in the republican process. For “personal
liberty” to be protected, Machiavelli states in Discorsi, it is necessary to put forth one’s efforts to the
“bene commune, the common good or public interest.”19 Essentially, without service to the public, a
republic will fall.
An example of the negative consequences of citizens being taken out of the process of a republic
in this manner can be seen in the ways civic humanists describe the fall of the Roman Republic. For
example, Leonardo Bruni’s Eulogy (1403–1404) laments the loss of Roman citizens’ ability “to take part
in the business of government,” which signals the nations fall from prominence “into the tyranny of the
Empire.”20 In the true spirit of humanist thought, examples from classical antiquity inform Bruni’s
knowledge of the republics of his time. The fate of republican governments that eliminate citizen
representation, he postulates, will be the same as the Roman Empire. To make his case, Bruni left out the
great heights and successes of the empire, while highlighting the rule of such infamous leaders as “the
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loathsome Caligula.”21 Famously, Caligula was a Roman emperor whose everyday deviant behavior
included sexual crimes as well as “torture and executions” with no just cause.22 The overarching theme
which Bruni conveyed in Eulogy is that as citizen participation decreases, the possibility of horrors like
Caligula’s rule becomes inevitable.
To avoid such degradation of republics requires citizen participation in government. Fifteenthcentury humanists developed a concise understanding of this idea. This concept of “active citizenship”
encompasses the moral obligation expressed within civic humanistic literature while also expressing the
desire for greater “freedom [in] one’s city.”23 This idea of actively engaging in the civic process of
political discourse and governance is at the core of the beliefs of civic humanists. It propelled them to
take action with their knowledge instead of hoarding it, as they accused the scholastics of doing. This
concept of involving oneself in civic matters, also known as vivere civile, expressed knowledge
practically in a manner that “the contemplative man” could only understand theoretically.24 This coincides
with the humanist belief in the active life, the vita activa. This debate between scholastics and humanists
perhaps best highlights the humanistic belief in civic engagement. If there is no “practical use in social
and political life” for a philosophical notion, then regardless of its content, such philosophical beliefs does
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not offer anything to the betterment of political reality.25 As Coluccio Salutati (former Chancellor of
Florence from 1375) said in a 1398 letter to Peregrino Zambeccari the Chancellor of Bologna, “the
contemplative life” may be more pleasant for one’s self, but the vita activa is “an exercise in virtue.”26
Civic humanism was the dominant political philosophy in fifteenth-century Florence. It included
a strong emphasis on the volatility of republics, and on the moral responsibility citizens had to participate
in a republic for the protection and freedom of its people. Perhaps not particularly intuitive is how
members of the Medici family used the political philosophy of civic humanism to advance their political
ambitions and consolidate what would eventually be the Medici plutocracy. Their aptitude for this form of
political advancement proved to be a major contributing factor to the success of their family in Florentine
society. A strong sense of civic engagement and the desire to protect republican values does not
immediately seem in line with the style of rule the Medici would use during the fifteenth century.
However, the family was able to use their knowledge of humanism to strengthen and justify their
plutocratic control over Florence. Cosimo’s patronage of multiple humanists helped him create the correct
appearance of a ruler who was a powerful friend to humanism. From a public relations viewpoint, it
allowed him to project himself as a strong and virtuous leader. In turn, this contributed to a larger
projection of power: utilizing the ideas of civic humanism and humanism as a whole, Cosimo de’ Medici
was able to use his patronage of humanists to create an image that greatly aided in his family’s political
dominance over the Republic of Florence. During the fifteenth century, in its most basic form, patronage
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meant a social network that allowed artists with “connections to powerful patrons” to fund and complete
their work.27
Perhaps the Medici most beloved by humanists and adept at using the ideology to his advantage
was Cosimo. There is perhaps no greater indicator of how humanists viewed Cosimo than the great praise
they gave him after his death when they and the Florentine citizens posthumously bestowed upon him the
title of “Pater Patriae of Florence.”28 It is natural and even expected to honor a great leader with a title
after his death, but because civic humanists greatly valued republican ideals, praising a ruler who limited
the republic initially appears to be peculiar. However, since Cosimo’s actions directly benefited these
humanists as well as their work, they ignored some actions that they would normally have criticized in
favor of praising his pro-humanist actions.
While Cosimo was prolific in his accomplishments and received much adulation, he was praised
for reasons that can be defined as entirely humanistic. For his “recovering and translating of classical
texts,” humanist scholars Leonardo Bruni and Poggio Bracciolini (1380–1459) commended Cosimo for
his commitment to their political philosophy.29 Such advancements in literary humanism highlight the
clear humanist interest of Cosimo de’ Medici. Patronage for such literary endeavors was essential for
humanists like Bruni and Bracciolini to fund their work, which affected their view of Cosimo. Part of
Cosimo’s overall appeal was his professed humility, which can help endear a person to any group. For
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instance, his frequent attendance at Santa Maria degli Angeli, a church whose creation was funded by the
Medici in 1434, where “humanist discussions” were held, made himself part of the humanist
community.30 Simple acts like interacting with his neighbors as an equal, instead of as the de facto leader
of Florence, by discussing humanist topics like education, art, and civic participation, certainly helped
ingratiate Cosimo with the humanists. The humanist community’s praise would go as far as to compare
Cosimo to a Roman statesman of old, fueled by “patriotism and republican pride.”31 Given the
Renaissance veneration of classical antiquity, this comparison does underscore the level admiration
Cosimo managed to gather during a lifetime.
Another reason Cosimo gained so much admiration from the humanist community during his
lifetime was his patronage of new humanist works. The Medici household established a diverse “network
of patronage and friendship” that had some of the most important creators of the humanistic art and
literature in Florence.32 The establishment of this network was vital to the livelihood of many artists and
financed the development of large amounts of Renaissance art. During the Quattrocento in Florence, the
Medici had essentially a monopoly in “the dispensation of favors” to these artists.33 One of the humanists
he greatly aided in his work was Niccolò de’ Niccoli (1364–1437). Cosimo assisted Niccoli in finding
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rare books, by taking responsibility for loans the humanist took out at the Medici bank, and even covering
all financial debts for him when escaping the 1420 plague.34 The backing of humanistic ventures (and
individuals) like these partially explains why so many humanists praised Cosimo. This patronage also
showed Cosimo’s business savvy that allowed him to see tangible value in these investments,
understanding that patronage served as a boon to his public relations. It should be noted that the financial
resources of the Medici Bank that Cosimo extended to Niccolò Niccoli were also given to other humanist
patrons.35
Cosimo de’ Medici’s life and career demonstrated his deep interest in civic humanism outside
mere patronage. The most obvious of these connections is how useful such knowledge could be to an
individual in his position of political power, particularly when it came to skills in rhetoric. While giving a
speech in 1448, Cosimo used his well-honed rhetorical skills by making a persuasive argument that
additional taxes were necessary for the defense of “liberty.”36 This skill of persuasion is formally known
as rhetoric and is one of the five subjects included in the studia humanitatis that lies at the basis of all
humanistic efforts.37 By exhibiting the skills of an accomplished rhetorician, Cosimo would have
impressed Florentine humanists with his persuasive speeches.
During the fifteenth century, civic humanism lauded the virtues of the republican government of
Florence and its superiority over tyrannical governments like the Duchy of Milan. While these simple
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descriptions of the political philosophy are applicable, they fail to illustrate civic humanism’s nuance.
However, it can be argued that in the aftermath of the Ciompi revolt, “Leonardo Bruni and his humanist
contemporaries” established an intellectual argument that the proper form of Florentine government was
what Mark Jurdjevic has called “oligarchic republicanism.”38 Earlier scholars argued that large swaths of
Quattrocento Florence seemed to run contrary to the city-state’s overall political philosophy. Hans
Baron’s argument about the strength of fifteenth-century “civic humanism” faces a pressing challenge in
the form of oligarchical Medici rule.39 Baron’s explanation for the existence of the Medici
oligarchy/plutocracy leaves a lot to be desired.
However, these Bruni-led humanists were not the only part of the community that was advocating
for a more oligarchical style rule instead of the republicanism of the fourteenth century. The ottimati or
aristocracy also created a “strain of humanistic ideas” that supported the developing “oligarchy.”40 The
political sphere in fifteenth-century Florence was evolving its beliefs on what precisely constituted a
republican government. They showed signs of accepting more authoritarian behavior and not rejecting it
as corrosive to the Republic of Florence. Any individuals within the group at large could devise a
rationale to justify Cosimo de’ Medici’s rise to political power simply by using the vast and “rich
ideology” of humanism.41 Especially remembering the humanistic skills of rhetoric and debate, it is easily
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conceivable that several reasonable-sounding explanations for relenting to oligarchical republicanism
were the best move for Florence.
However, the use of civic humanist thought by the Medici to justify their control of the Republic
of Florence was not indefensible. Civic humanists could argue that they did not change their position and
state that “oligarchies are still republics” that cannot be equated with tyranny.42 The oligarchic, or (as this
work asserts) plutocratic Florentine government of the fifteenth century theoretically operated under the
principles of a republican government with fewer and wealthier representatives. This philosophical
change from the veneration of republican style government to the allowance of a more oligarchical rule
can be seen in Leonardo Bruni’s History of the Florentine People. For example, Bruni’s description of the
banishment of Benedetto Alberti (d. 1388), who advocated for wider citizen involvement in government,
depicts a regime trying to prevent a threat to their power in the name of “firmness and security.”43
Bruni’s History of the Florentine People did not have the same appeal to “populism,” or political
ideas focused on the people, that his earlier works had, and it spoke more favorably of the Medici regime,
likely due to Cosimo’s decision to elevate him “to the reggimento (aristocratic/noble families).” 44 This
quid pro quo style of interaction not only illustrates the influence Cosimo de’ Medici exerted over the
humanist movement, but it also shows the civic humanists’ transition in thought from advocating for a
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republican Florence to condoning a more oligarchical style of government. From a purely cynical
viewpoint, these learned individuals changed their principles to gain favor with Florence’s ruling family.
At best, the civic humanist who gained something from Cosimo either through patronage or otherwise felt
his support of their work was a validation of their ideas.
Cosimo’s patronage of humanists like Bruni should be recognized for its contribution to the
Medici family and their image of power in Florence. However, it was by no means the only form of
patronage that the Medici participated in. Throughout the fifteenth century, Cosimo and his son Lorenzo
the Magnificent used artistic patronage to project their family’s power. Through paintings, sculptures, and
monumental architecture, the Medici family utilized the rich artistic production of Florence during the
Quattrocento to their advantage. In creating this image of their banking family as powerful yet virtuous
leaders of Florence, the Medici were able to effectively use this creation to help support their plutocratic
rule during much of the fifteenth century. Cosimo and Lorenzo were by no means the only individuals
who understood the power art could have in the projection of power. However, their use of the medium is
key to understanding their rule of Florence.
Of the forms of artistic patronage that helped project the powerful image of the Medici family,
the building of monumental architectural structures was among the most important. This can be seen in
the construction of the church of Santa Maria degli Angeli which, along with San Lorenzo, offered the
family two prominent houses of worship near both their family residence and the center of Florence to
illustrate their wealth and power.45 Cosimo de’ Medici spent “very large sums of money” on monumental
structures at a time when building such massive projects was not in vogue.46 A business-oriented family

45

R. Burr Litchfield, Online Gazetteer of Sixteenth Century Florence.

Florentine Renaissance Resources/STG: Brown University, Providence, R.I., 2006.

46

A. D. Fraser Jenkins, “Cosimo De’ Medici’s Patronage of Architecture and the Theory of

Magnificence,” Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes 33 (1970): 162, doi:10.2307/750894.

31
such as the Medici would not needlessly spend money on expensive ventures like the building of large
structures without the belief that it would benefit them in some manner. For example, the rebuilding of
the eleventh-century church of San Lorenzo with the aid of famed architect Filippo Brunelleschi (1377–
1446) served the purpose of asserting the family’s power and association with the church in Florence.47
While Cosimo’s spending on architectural projects could be seen as a show of power, the man who would
become the Archbishop of Ragusa and friend of Cosimo, Timoteo Maffei (1415–1470), described him as
a “magnificent man.”48 In this context, the adjective describes the great and virtuous actions of an
individual of the plutocratic ruling class.
One example of monumental architecture that Cosimo de’ Medici created that was able to project
the family’s power and influence was his personal palace. This palazzo, situated in central Florence,
serves as a prime example of a structure that expressed “the patron’s interests” to any who saw it while
also setting a standard of excellence among other private residences of the Quattrocento’s elite.49 Both the
Medici palace and the family’s favorite church (San Lorenzo) portrayed the power Cosimo and his
banking family had, but each in a different way. The reconstruction of the local church associates the
Medici with the power of the church and the power of God to the parishioners. The Medici palace and its
contents, on the other hand, conveyed Cosimo’s humanist interests. While there could be a concern that
such a projection of power could send the wrong message, in context with Cosimo’s other patronage
efforts, the use of monumental architecture provided a positive image for the Medici family.
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Throughout much of the fifteenth century, Lorenzo continued the connection between his family
and the church of San Lorenzo by adding to his grandfather Cosimo’s work. This was no small
investment either: Lorenzo furthered the building’s reconstruction with a financial contribution of “6,570
florins in the period 1477–81.”50 A banking family with as much capital as the Medici could produce this
amount of money, but it was not a trivial sum. According to the Catasto of 1427, which provides tax
records for Florence from that year, only 137 households had “10,000 florins or more in total
assessment.”51 Based on these statistics, Lorenzo made a massive investment in this architectural project
because he felt it was an important projection of power.
As much as the Medici palace constructed by Cosimo de’ Medici projected his power as well as
his personal interests, so too did the Poggio a Caiano villa for Lorenzo. By 1473, Lorenzo de’ Medici
purchased the villa on which he would spend considerable amounts of capital, to rebuild it as an image of
his power.52 The time this project took to complete served to make the villa a showcase of who Lorenzo
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was and what interests he had. This villa demonstrated his love for ancient architecture, and his grandiose
building project conveyed the image that he deserved a royal palace.53 Whoever would visit this private
residence of Lorenzo de’ Medici would be keenly aware of the power and influence the owner of the
house possessed. Experiencing the space alone allows any visitor to understand the immense wealth the
Medici had in a more tangibly way than merely knowing of their banking empire. Along with the personal
touches that Lorenzo added to his villa, it made a clear statement that he and his family are among the
preeminent elites in the region.
Medici projections of power did not consist merely of grand architectural structures but also
included works of art like paintings and sculptures. One example of such a work of art was Donatello’s
bronze David and Judith and Holofernes statues that were a fixture in “outdoor spaces of the Medici
Palace in Florence for about thirty years.”54 For a work of art to be displayed so notably at the Medici
palace, suggests some importance, but it served a greater purpose. The giant-slayer David had been
coopted to “a new political role…as a defender of Florence” and the city-state’s “republican
government.”55 This is a bold adoption of the republic’s ideal by a single-family. First, David’s placement
in the Medici palace asserts that they are the sole defenders of Florence against the threat of tyranny by
associating David’s fight against tyranny with Goliath. Second, the sculpture being housed within the
residence suggests a blatant control over a supposed representative government like the Republic of
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Florence. This suggestion of control is also taking place only several hundred meters away from the seat
of Florence’s government, the Palazzo della Signoria.56
Donatello’s other work displayed at the Medici palace was Judith and Holofernes, a statue that
represented Judith “rallying…for liberty against the evils of tyrannical rule.”57 While this message does
reiterate the symbolic meaning of the David sculpture, it also provides a more virtuous and feminine
figure in this battle against tyranny: the widow Judith’s execution of Holofernes, the Assyrian general
trying to destroy the city of Bethulia, is a depiction of courage in defense of one’s home and pride in that
home. Together, these sculptures provided the Medici family with “an antityrannical” symbol that could
be seen in the “public space of their palace’s courtyard.”58 While not all parts of the palace were for
public consumption, these courtyards could be seen by any resident of Florence or perhaps even a visitor
to the city-state. Upon viewing these beautiful sculptures with the grand palace as a backdrop, even the
casual observer could draw several conclusions. The Medici had immense wealth and influence because
of that wealth, but the projection of their goals invokes civic humanist thought, not just financial success.
The audience should conclude that this banking family will protect the Republic of Florence from the
threats of tyranny and will do so in a virtuous manner. Artistic projections of power used in this manner
not only made people believe that the Medici have great political power but were also meant to reassure
the people that the family would not misuse it.
Perhaps the best example of the Medici family’s use of art as a projection of power can be found
in the chapel within the Medici palace. The chapel had various artistic features, but the frescos provide
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particularly useful imagery. The art is the chapel had the “chief theme” of “the Journey of the Magi” that
contained frescos by Benozzo Gozzoli (1421–1497), associating the Medici with the fortune and “regal
power” of the Magi.59 Such an association with biblical figures in the story of Jesus’s birth who also had
political and economic power only served to bolster the image of the Medici. This artistic depiction
appeals to the political power of the wise kings and the power related to the most powerful figure in
Christianity, Jesus Christ.
Would a projection of power be a worthwhile investment in such a space where very few
individuals would see the artistic work? Yes, because the use of art such as this would be witnessed by
figures like the Duke of Milan. Galeazzo Maria Sforza (1444–1476), when visiting Cosimo de’ Medici in
1459, went to the chapel and described it as an opulent decorated “earthly paradise.”60 Note that a duke of
a powerful Italian state would visit Cosimo’s residence for a private meeting. This illustrates what kind of
power Cosimo wielded in fifteenth-century Italian politics. The Medici used art to create an image and a
perception of power to the entire city-state of Florence, including the few who were admitted inside the
private realm of the family, and to visiting dignitaries. An image of this nature had clear advantages and
helped the family’s control over the Republic of Florence during the fifteenth century. However,
projecting that same perception of power to fellow elites like Sforza could arguably be more important in
so far as dealing with powerful Italian figures.
During the fifteenth century, the Medici family under the leadership of Cosimo and Lorenzo were
able to use the vast pool of artistic talent to provide imagery that conveyed the power they wanted others
to believe they had. They did so not only through visual mediums like architecture or sculpture but also
by using the political philosophy of civic humanism. In the latter part of the fourteenth century and
throughout the Quattrocento, civic humanism was the premier philosophical perspective on how to
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administrate republican governments correctly. Civic humanists, who believed republics to be susceptible
to corruption, aimed to protect the core mechanisms of this form of representative government against
entities that historically had harmed them. While civic humanists argued that citizens had a moral
obligation to participate in republics and safeguard the government from degradation, these beliefs could
also be used to justify a plutocracy in practice. The Medici understood this notion and utilized it to justify
their political dominance during the Quattrocento.
This utilization of civic humanism and its principles to support the Medici rule had clear
ideological contradictions that could be seen as irreconcilable. However, civic humanists like Leonardo
Bruni used the very principles, which advocated for a republican government to justify the Medici’s
plutocratic dominance of the Republic of Florence. A dramatic shift in belief such as this seems to be
explained purely by the monetary gain or advantageous positions offered by leaders like Cosimo de’
Medici. There is evidence (for example, in the works of Leonardo Bruni and Poggio Bracciolini) that
suggests that humanists believed Cosimo de’ Medici to have been a beneficial ruler, but such accolades
could have merely been repayment for his support of their livelihood.
The Republic of Florence was controlled by the Medici for much of the fifteenth century in part
because the family was able to use philosophical and artistic movements happening in their city-state to
their advantage. While certainly both Cosimo and Lorenzo had personal interests in civic humanism or
Renaissance art, they none the less understood how to use these entities to create an image of power for
the Medici. This projection of power required the creation of an intricate network of Florentine patronage
with an investment of capital that could easily be considered a fortune by the standards of the fifteenth
century. The importance the Medici placed on the use of civic humanism and artistic endeavors towards
buttressing their image should be reflected in the examination of the family’s rule over Florence during
the Quattrocento.

37
CHAPTER 3
POLITICS AND MEDICI MANIPULATION
In the fifteenth century, Cosimo and Lorenzo de’ Medici were able to exert control over the
Republic of Florence’s governmental systems. Such influence over the Italian city-state helps demonstrate
the plutocratic rule over Florence during the Quattrocento despite the pretense of the government’s
republican nature. True, the success of the Medici’s regime would not be possible without capitalizing on
a few moments that were politically advantageous, and that required more great timing than anything.
However, the banking family was able to exert so much influence because the systems of governance that
existed in the Republic of Florence were not secure against manipulation from talented and wellconnected political operatives. The electoral process was a particular target of interest for the Medici
during the Quattrocento; influencing it allowed the family to assert control beyond that normally afforded
a republican majority. This electoral manipulation, among other factors this chapter will examine, allowed
the Medici family to govern the Republic of Florence as a plutocracy.
To properly understand this exploitation of Florentine civic institutions during the fifteenth
century, there must first be an examination of some events that occurred in the thirteenth and fourteenth
centuries. This includes developments like the transition away from the aristocratically ran government
and the events of the Ciompi Revolt, which drastically changed representation in the Republic of
Florence. In the absence of this context, the Florentine political landscape of the fifteenth century may
appear to have logical contradictions because of the great complexities created by the previous centuries.
One aspect that is important to understand is how a power vacuum developed in the Florentine
government during the thirteenth century that allowed certain families to dominate the Republic of
Florence during the fifteenth century. Laws like the 1293 Ordinances of Justice helped put limitations on
the magnates or ruling class of Florence. For instance, Ordinance IX states that a magnate would be
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punished for taking the property of a member of the popolo grasso (wealthy guild/mercantile class).1 The
popolo grasso found fault in the governing style of the aristocracy of Florence and created statutes like
this based on their experiences. Over the course of years, these statutes helped a group of “merchants,
bankers, and tradesmen” replace the traditional “noblemen” and create a new ruling class of the Republic
of Florence.2
These members of Florentine society saw fault in the city-state’s aristocratic leadership and
managed to replace it with individuals of non-noble ancestry to rule in their stead. This change meant
excluding some nobles from holding elected office, but those who were excluded constituted a small
minority of the overall noble population, and others were still able to hold “the highest municipal
positions.”3 So while this displacement was important, it did not eliminate the aristocratic presence from
the Florentine political stage. Actions of this nature made rule by the elite families of the popolo grasso
possible during the Quattrocento by establishing the precedent that new families could enter the
Florentine ruling class. In addition, there could be a displacement of those in control of the government,
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as happened to both the Albizzi and the Medici during the fifteenth century. Thus, while the Ordinances
themselves were not the mechanism for removing powerful families like the Albizzi from power, the idea
of removing those in control from power to allow for new rulers persisted. The Albizzi, whose regime
over Florence lasted from 1382 to 1434, ultimately failed because of Cosimo de’ Medici’s return from
exile in 1434.4
The most critical incident that contributed to the Florentine political landscape of the fifteenth
century was the events of the Ciompi Revolt (1378–1382). Many complex factors led to the revolt of the
Florentine textile workers, but ultimately this social conflict resulted in these rebels replacing the
“governing elites” with a short-lived revolutionary government.5 Those in power and the rebels had
completely different perspectives on the cause of this violent revolt. To those ruling elites, this revolt was
nothing but an attempt by the peasants to upset “the social order” of Florence.6 However, those in
rebellion argued that they were fighting for greater representation within the Republic of Florence7 This
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Niccolò Machiavelli, The Florentine History, trans. Ninian Hill Thomson, (London: Archibald

Constable and Co. Limited, 1906), 198.

40
meant allowing non-guildsmen into the electoral process, which threatened the Florentine elites’ control
of the government. While this attempted realignment of the Florentine political landscape was
unsuccessful, the threat of the masses demanding greater representation became an ever-present fear in
the minds of the elite ruling class.8
In the Quattrocento, the government of Florence consisted of various bodies, with the number of
councils varying, depending on the stage in the republic’s development and on what additional legislative
committees had been added to address certain issues. It is important to understand how the republican
government functioned to highlight the areas in which it was susceptible to manipulation. The two main
types of government positions either dealt directly with legislation or provided support for legislative
activities. For example, the Signoria, which consisted of nine members who served two-month terms,
would initiate legislation with consultation from various government officials called “Gonfaloniere”
(banner bearers).9 The Signoria, the Sedici Gonfalonieri (Sixteen Standard Bearers), and the Dodici
Buonuomini (Twelve Good Men) combined to form the body called the Tre Maggiori (Three Major),
which consisted of the “three highest executive positions” and were the main parts of the governmental
body.10 The Tre Maggiori had varying powers over the government throughout the fifteenth century and
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had varying responsibilities. Another crucial position in the fifteenth-century Florentine government was
the priorate, which was the principal executive body of the state. It had eight members, including the
Gonfaloniere della Giustizia or Banner Bearer of Justice whose primary role was described as
“maintaining public order” through leading the city’s security forces.11
In this period, the total number of citizens that were even included in the process of forming a
government in Florence numbered around five thousand.12 This was by no means a large portion of the
Florentine population. For instance, in the first half of the sixteenth century, Florence had between 50,000
and 70,000 people living in the city.13 So, only ten percent of the population was eligible for office and
not all of those who were eligible sought to serve in the government. Thus, the Republic of Florence’s
government was an exclusive group. It can be surmised that a government formed in this manner would
be more likely to serve this exclusive group’s interests.
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The early Florentine republic required that individuals who were eligible for office must be an
active guild member who was formally enrolled in the association and working in that guild’s trade.14
Even among eligible candidates who could hold a governmental office, there was a further screening
process for elected positions within the Florentine government. This bureaucratic procedure, called
squittino (scrutiny), demanded officeholders meet specific qualifications, like age requirements,
limitations on consecutive elections, and having no suspicion of nepotism.15 Only then were these citizens
allowed to enter in various elections for government positions “every five years” after 1415.16 Because of
this separation between those who were eligible for election and those who made it through the scrutiny
of an elected position, officeholders were an even more exclusive group. As with many things in
Florentine politics, the scrutiny of eligible citizens was tied to the guild system. This system created a
“very limited elite” group that was based on allegiance or partisanship to the guilds that made someone
far more likely to be elected.17 Such a system could be correctly described as an oligarchy instead of a
republic.
After the scrutiny process, the Republic of Florence’s Signoria had another unique and potentially
susceptible step to elect municipal officials. The names of potential candidates who had been scrutinized
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were written on pieces of paper that were put in leather pouches (borse) and drawn randomly by officials
called the accopiatori, whose original job was simply to fill the pouches.18 That term has no direct
translation into English; in a modern translation, it means coupler, but the historical definition of
accopiatori is a “municipal magistrate in charge of ballots.” 19
The accopiatori system is an interesting aspect of the Republic of Florence’s government because
of its intended duty, the group’s actions, and its ability to manipulate the Signoria. Essentially, this step in
the selection process was designed or intended to create a random choice among individuals who have
been previously designated as worthy of holding public office. Even after that step, there was another part
of the process that sought to eliminate unqualified individuals, a measure which took into consideration
unpaid taxes, their criminal background, and if they or “a parent held a similar position.”20 This entire
process was designed to have the appearance of checks and balances, but in fact, included areas in which
manipulation of the electoral process appears at first glance to be relatively easy. However, this depended
heavily on the standing of an individual’s family among the Florentine political community.
Another exercise of the accopiatori’s power dealt with the elections themselves. During this same
period, from 1434–1441, the accopiatori decided which “eligible citizens…[were] present for sortition”
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and even set how many names were put up for sortition in Signoria elections.21 Simply, sortition is the
process of drawing lots to elect an official. Technically, the selection of the Signoria was random, but the
odds were created in such a way that candidates who were preferable to the individual in charge could be
expected to win. These particular manipulations of the Florentine constitution just happened to coincide
with Cosimo de’ Medici’s political ascendancy, which was characterized by governmental manipulations
and electoral controls.22 In 1434, Cosimo was elected to the office, established in the 1293 Ordinances of
Justice IIII, as Vexilliferi iustitie, of Gonfaloniere di Giustizia and in 1435, he was elected to the
Buonuomini, both positions in the Tre Maggiori.23 While there is no direct evidence that Cosimo
instructed the accopiatori to interject themselves in the election process, it seems a likely conclusion: it
would explain how he was able to exert so much political influence over the republican government.
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As has been demonstrated by the actions of the accopiatori, the sortition process was heavily
manipulated. There are numerous situations where the sortition process took place, but results were
ignored or thrown out: “the office was not given to the first citizen whose name was drawn,” even if he
was eligible, and “the drawing of names would continue until” the designated number of candidates had
been pulled from the borse.24 The Medici’s political interference throughout the fifteenth century
appeared to contradict the design of the electoral process. The disregard for the procedure of sortition or
the elimination of the procedure altogether suggests the manipulation of elections. One example of the
constitutional procedure for sortition being violated occurred during the latter part of Lorenzo de’
Medici’s control over Florence (1483–1494) when individuals being elected to the Signoria were allowed
to nominate familial “substitutions” for their office.25 The system established in fifteenth-century Florence
had many ways to circumvent the intended result of the election. Manipulation, particularly when it
comes to sortition, was fairly easy. At least theoretically, the fair election of officials to government
positions is a necessary component of a republic. In this sense, the Medici led Republic of Florence was
not republican.
The Republic of Florence also had mechanisms in place that would allow the rules and
regulations of the government to be circumvented in special circumstances. This “Florentine custom”
involved the government calling an advisory meeting or pratiche of influential and wealthy citizens who
could vote to give special powers or baliae to the government for a short period of time.26 Essentially, if
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some issue came up that needed to be addressed but did not fall under the jurisdiction of any particular
body of government, those in the economic elite could vote to enact those powers to address said issue.
These special grants of power varied greatly depending on the situation at hand. For instance, the balìa
had the power to recall Cosimo from exile in 1434 and gave special electoral authority the accopiatori,
which was a characteristic of the Medici regime throughout the fifteenth century.27
Certainly, there are scenarios in the course of governmental affairs that call for special powers,
like the Republic of Florence's practice of balia, and those powers could have been used responsibly. For
instance, the balia did provide “certain advantages in time[s] of war” because it could address a specific
issue without dealing with the normal governmental channels, which is a beneficial option for a
government.28 However, the use of special powers was in conflict with the function of the republican
systems in the Florentine government, even transforming the nature of the Republic of Florence
altogether. Some of these conflicts include appointing “councillors for three years,” which went outside
the traditional power of the balia, “determin[ing] the next scrutinies,” and the passing of tax legislation
that led to the institution being threatened with elimination.29
These problems were particularly an issue while Cosimo de’ Medici was in power and went
outside the Florentine Republic’s constitutional procedure. Each one of these extraconstitutional powers
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could easily be manipulated by a major political figure like Cosimo if his desired governmental outcomes
were not being achieved through traditional channels. Even though alleged misuse was brought forward
in July 1447, the Signoria, which included Cosimo de’ Medici, was unable to create “a limitation of the
Balia’s powers.”30 The outcome of this decision benefited a government influenced by an individual like
Cosimo because he could now achieve objectives the Signoria could not or would not accomplish.
Ultimately, the balia represents a government mechanism that could be shaped to suit the needs of a given
situation and could also be used to bypass the traditional legislative process.
Having gained some further understanding of how Florentine institutional structures and
governing bodies were susceptible to manipulation, a more informed examination of how the Medici
influenced the government in the fifteenth century is possible. Cosimo de’ Medici’s influence and power
in the Republic of Florence was not a secret. Both non-Florentines and citizens of Florence described him
as the city’s “Pater Patriae.”31 A title that means “Father of the Country” is not given to an individual if
they do not have considerable power and influence over some of the governmental institutions. Such
influence over Florentine politics was not at all guaranteed during the Quattrocento. For instance, Cosimo
was exiled from Florence on multiple occasions, including in September 1433, before the Medici regime
assumed control over the city-state.32 However, Cosimo had allies within the government that paved the
way for his political comeback. After his return to Florence, thanks to the help of the Signoria, most of
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“the Albizzi party” who had been responsible for his exile were exiled themselves as Cosimo ascended to
political power by 1434.33
Within over four years, Cosimo had managed to accumulate the most political power of any
individual in Florence.34 This accomplishment had no official title and could have been argued to be
antithetical to the ideals of the Republic of Florence. Nevertheless, Cosimo became the sole ruler of
Florence with the momentum of his conflicts with the Albizzi.35 To achieve this political domination
requires not only political savviness but a deep understanding of how the Republic of Florence works on a
systematic level. To have one individual, supported by a faction, who decides the fate of representative
government questions the validity of said representative government.
In that vein, Cosimo de’ Medici developed a strategy for acquiring political power that took
advantage of the vulnerabilities of the Florentine institutions and procedures detailed at the beginning of
this chapter. In part, this strategy consisted of weakening the government of the commune by filling
offices with those who were personally loyal to the Medici, and in this way, the Medici family soon
achieved political dominance.36 Given how easily the processes of the Florentine government were
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manipulated and the existence of special powers that can confer great political power on some officials,
such a strategy could certainly be accomplished. Ultimately, Cosimo and the Medici’s manipulation of the
elections of government officials and the packing of the government with Medici sympathizes created a
strong political regime in the Quattrocento.37 The exploitation of governmental processes by the ruling
class to achieve their desired goal does not highlight Florence’s republican nature during the fifteenth
century. The knowledge of Medicean election tampering suggests the degradation of the Florentine
republican government into a plutocratic regime.
Filling the offices in the Republic of Florence with partisan politicians who were sympathetic to
the Medici cause was not the only means of directly affecting the government. Throughout the fifteenth
century, no decade saw fewer than five elections of a Medici to the Tre Maggiori.38 This electoral
dominance saw two decades (the 1430s and 1480s) that exceeded single-digit elections.39 This illustrates
the concerted effort by Cosimo and later his grandson Lorenzo de’ Medici to have their family in
important government positions. During this time, there is even a noticeable presence of the Medici
among the guild consuls; one unsurprising fact is their heavy influence in the guild for bankers and
moneychangers, the Arte del Cambio.40 Essentially, every level of government was either infiltrated by
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the Medici or those who sided with them. If all of these individuals answered to one strong leader, like
Cosimo or later Lorenzo, then control of the government becomes a more feasible task.
Even with the controlling political approach of Cosimo de’ Medici, he attempted to create
amicable relationships with other political operatives. “Cosimo and the other members of the Medici
family” portrayed themselves as individuals who would grant favors to other influential people.41 These
types of actions fostered beneficial relationships because if people of prominence ask someone else for a
favor, it must be a difficult task to complete. Being considered the individual who can grant impossible
wishes is advantageous for both parties involved. For instance, the podestà of the city of Prato, Piero di
Salvestro Ainardi (in office between 1434–1464), quickly granted a request of the Pater Patriae of
Florence because he “wanted to do something to please” him.42 Because Cosimo was known as a gracious
patron who could grant individuals favors, people would go out of their way to get in his good graces so
that one day when they did ask him for a favor, he might be more inclined to acquiesce. These types of
political relationships can be very useful in maintaining control of an entire government like Cosimo and
the Medici did throughout the Quattrocento.
Cosimo’s grandson, Lorenzo, became the custodian of the Medici enterprise after his father Piero
de’ Medici (1416–1469) died after a turbulent reign in which the family’s dominance of Florence had
been challenged by France, Venice, and internal political pressures.43 Lorenzo claimed the seat of power
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at a time of political turmoil and depleted assets from the Medici Bank due to mismanagement after the
death of Cosimo.44 Given the unfavorable conditions, manipulating the Republic of Florence would be
difficult. In response to this crisis, Lorenzo decided to take lessons in governance from his successful
predecessors. For instance, Lorenzo adopted “the Medici policy” of addressing partisan rivalries by
putting himself in the role of the “supreme mediator.”45 Instead of creating more enemies, who were not
already taking issue with the Medici regime’s control of Florence, he decided to take the position of the
peacemaker. Such a role created a good perception and allowed for easier political relationships during
his tenure as de facto leader of Florence.
Lorenzo did not stay behind the scenes as much as Cosimo did during his reign over the
Florentine government. On six different occasions, Lorenzo held office in the Tre Maggiori between 1454
and 1482.46 Although this might seem like simple governmental participation on his part, the
manipulation of the electoral systems by the Medici dashes that notion. Perhaps Cosimo preferred to
tamper with the constitutional processes of government in a less obvious manner than Lorenzo, but the
results were the same. While Lorenzo continued these practices, which allowed the Medici regime to gain
power under Cosimo, he took actions like the creation of the Council of Seventy (1480), which expanded
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the power of the family’s influence over Florence. These actions led to the regime being perceived as
overtly “oligarchical,” but ultimately allowed Lorenzo to achieve the necessary “electoral controls”
through the accopiatori to better secure his power in 1470–1471.47
The kinds of power Lorenzo de’ Medici gained through these and other internal political battles
are best illustrated through a brief examination of the story of the Besalú brothers. In 1486, the two
Besalú Brothers, who were merchant bankers, fled to Florence from the Kingdom of Naples because of
their business association with an enemy of Naples.48 Certainly, there is a clear motive for the brothers to
go to Florence, but Lorenzo’s reason to defend the merchant bankers is not immediately clear unless this
incident benefited the Medici. The Besalú Brothers had considerable information about mercantile
business across the Italian Peninsula, including “activities in the grain trade.”49 This information was
valuable to the Medici, whose banking empire could take as much valuable information as possible.
Despite the heated diplomatic exchange over the Besalú brothers and their monetary debt, Lorenzo de’
Medici worked behind the scenes to defend the Besalú brothers. This resulted in the arbitration of the
matter that forced the King of Naples, Ferdinand I (1423-1494), to pay the brothers the money they were
owed “in Florence.”50 The political maneuvering to accomplish this impressive feat is not the main focus
of this analysis. The fact that Lorenzo chose to defend these two merchant bankers from the might of the
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Kingdom of Naples using the Florentine government illustrates how much unilateral control he had over
the Republic of Florence.
While the Medici regime certainly fostered enemies since the family’s ascension in 1434, the
decades of power and minority suppression reached a violent climax in the spring of 1478. In April of that
year, the Medici regime was challenged with an “unsuccessful attempt on Lorenzo’s life” by the Pazzi
family and their co-conspirators that resulted in the death of his younger brother Guiliano.51 Previous
challenges to the Medicean dominance over the Republic of Florence were merely political in nature, and
not an attempt to take someone’s life. This signified a tipping point that changed the future of the
Florentine political scene. After the events of the Pazzi Conspiracy, “the republican political culture of
consensus” began to deteriorate as challenges to dominate political entities would no longer be isolated to
“the electoral cycle.”52 The Medici responded decisively to this violent act of opposition.
First, the authorities caught and punished the conspirators, extinguishing their dream of a popular
uprising.53 Even in the aftermath of the attempted assassination, the government still sided with and
followed the orders of the Medici. This maintenance of the political status quo can be attributed to the
strength of the family’s political machine. Understandably, Lorenzo grew increasingly wary and fearful in
the wake of the deadly attack on his family, deciding to change the constitution of Florence to maintain
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the Medici family’s rule.54 This reaction would be the most overt example of the Medici’s control over
the Republic of Florence. The men Lorenzo nominated to the Council of Seventy were a group of
sympathetic officeholders who served as an official representation of the Medici’s control over the citystate of Florence.55 Until this point, Lorenzo and Cosimo had exercised immense influence over the
governmental proceedings of the Florentine Republic but had done so by manipulating the existing
institutions. However, with the creation of this council, Lorenzo’s manipulation of the Republic of
Florence is blatant and explicitly not republican in nature. These fundamental “reforms” marginalized the
Signoria’s role in the Republic of Florence and signified further degradation of the republican
government under the Medici.56
During the fifteenth century, the Republic of Florence’s systems of government did not
adequately protect the integrity of the Florentine constitution, and the chief manipulation of these systems
was perpetrated by the Medici. The primary argument of the overall work is that the government of
Florence was not a republic but instead a plutocracy. While the economic aspect of this proposition will
be discussed in a later chapter, the republican nature of Florence has been brought into question in this
chapter by examining evidence of the Medici’s aristocratic style of controlling the city-state’s political
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institutions.57 However, the banking family, particularly under Cosimo, did not always forcibly exert their
will so much as exploit the governmental processes that remained vulnerable to these types of actions.
The practice of sortition, which consisted of drawing candidate names by lot from a leather pouch
(borse), involved steps in the electoral process that were vulnerable to nefarious interference. As was seen
with the accopiatori, who were originally tasked with merely filling the borse, this governmental entity
gained powers not detailed in the Florentine bylaws and became instruments of the Medici dominance
during the Quattrocento. Without the involvement of the accopiatori in the electoral process, Cosimo de’
Medici would not have had as much control and influence over the Republic Florence as he did from
1434–1464. These special powers or balie granted to these civic institutions had little restrictions in some
cases and Cosimo was able to use this to his advantage.
Both Cosimo and Lorenzo exhibited far more control over the Florentine government than any
political office they held warranted, and this control contradicted the city-state’s republican ideals. One
important method of acquiring power, started by Cosimo and continued by Lorenzo, was filling the
government with Medici sympathizers to make it easier to exact their will over the Republic of Florence.
The Medici leaders also created a perception that they were individuals who could grant any favor as long
as this relationship was reciprocal. Whatever political issues arose, the Medici either portrayed
themselves as mediators above the petty squabbles of Florentine politics or as strong leaders willing to
stand up to outside political adversaries like the Kingdom of Naples. Lorenzo was even able to take the
tragic events of the Pazzi Conspiracy and consolidate immense political power that was monarchical in
nature.
Any examination of the family’s actions after their ascension in 1434 leads to the same
conclusion; the Medici exacted influence and control that far exceeded the bounds of a republican official.
There was a clear effort by their regime to pervert the electoral process to their advantage. By creating a
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near consensus among the governmental bodies, through un-republican means, the Medici were able to
maintain control over the Republic of Florence and push their political agenda until 1494. These political
machinations worked in concert with the family’s artistic patronage and were supported by the Medici
bank’s economic activities.
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CHAPTER 4
THE ECONOMIC REALITY OF THE PLUTOCRACY
Fifteenth-century Florentine society was, in part, characterized by the influence and power the
economic elite wielded over the government. The Medici used their banking empire to exercise great
influence within this plutocratic ruling class. To most effectively examine how these wealthy citizens
formed a plutocracy over Florence, it is important to not only understand the economic reality of the citystate during the Quattrocento, but also to discern which of these influential individuals comprised this
ruling class, and how they acquired their wealth. Analyzing the Florentine banking industry (particularly
the Medici) or mercantile ventures is important to understand the Florentine economy, and to understand
the private interests of the plutocrats. This knowledge can then be used to explain the conditions of the
economic elite in relation to the larger Florentine economy.
In Quattrocento Florence, there were no sharp delineations that definitively put one wealthy
family in the economic or political elite. In retrospect, historians can identify the most economically
powerful families in part by using sources like the Catasto of 1427, which is available in a searchable
database online.1 The Catasto was a system of assessing land that allowed for efficient taxation.2 A
deeper statistical analysis of those exceedingly wealthy Florentine citizens who also held public office
will differentiate between those who were in the economic elite and those who were not. This analysis
includes focusing on the Medici family and the great wealth they were able to amass through their
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international banking empire. Making a connection between the economically privileged and the systems
of the Republic of Florence is crucial in providing evidence of a plutocracy during the fifteenth century.
This information will not only establish the economic reality of Florence during the fifteenth century but
will also show which individuals comprised the economic elite that influenced the Florentine government
during the Quattrocento.
The Florentine economy that existed during the fifteenth century was the result of a combination
of complex factors that created the unique fiscal situation in the Tuscan city-state. The Florentine
economy was not isolated to the city walls but extended into the surrounding area. This network of over a
thousand communities known as the contado existed under a Florentine-run “fiscal system,” which fell
under the jurisdiction of the city-state’s efficient tax system, the Catasto, by 1428.3 However, this process
of establishing “uniform laws and taxation” was an accumulative one that began in the 1340s when
Florence began uniting its jurisdictional control over these adjacent communities.4 This financial
infrastructure does not account for the city-state’s international monetary interactions and their effect on
the economy. However, it does demonstrate that Florence’s economy was influenced by the territorial
dominance the city-state had over the surrounding area and that neighboring areas contributed to the
taxation the city collected.
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From the tenth to the fourteenth century, European-wide economic growth spurred on by
international trading, which increased wealth, urbanization, and economic activity in cities like Florence.5
While centuries of an economic uptick preceding the Quattrocento have a bearing on the city-state’s
economy during that century, the fourteenth century saw a transformative societal event that had a great
effect on Florence’s economy. This transformative event was known as the Black Death (1347–1353) and
it devastated the population of the European continent. It hit the Italian peninsula the hardest, recording “a
fall in urbanization that was greater than that of other European states.” 6 A sharp population decline of
this magnitude placed an economic strain on the city’s ability to produce because of the absence of
workers. However, by 1450, Florence’s population and urbanization had recovered from the horrors
of the Black Death that Marchionne di Coppo Stefani (1336–1385) had described initially in 1348.7
Such a rapid demographic change affected the economic production and consumption of the
Italian urban centers during the first half of the Quattrocento but did not characterize the entire century.
During the second half of the fifteenth century, an economic rebound included both an increase in
population and urbanization, accompanied by the development of new industries, including firearms and
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printing, as well as banking across the peninsula that included Florence and its surrounding area.8 This
illustrates Florence’s dynamic societal and economic situation during the fourteenth and fifteenth
centuries. These aspects of the Florentine economy, as well as the related subjects of population and
urbanization, demonstrate how rapidly a city can change during a brief time of its history.
The devastation that the Black Death brought to Florence did not have solely negative effects on
the city-state’s economy. The rapid change observed in population and urbanization led to a rebound
trend affecting Tuscany’s income inequality. After the Black Death, there was “a period of decline in
economic inequality,” which partially rebounded by the latter part of the fourteenth century.9 This
economic rebound is one way the Black Death provided some beneficial outcomes to those workers who
managed to survive. From 1348 through roughly 1460, “the unskilled manual laborer,” one whose various
duties relied on human strength, was far better off than his counterpart before 1348 because he
experienced an increase in wages due to the effects of the decreased population: the labor shortage created
competition for workers and inflated their salaries.10 Modern scholars like Richard Goldthwaite have
access to many records concerning the Florentine construction industry, which means that construction is
a good reference point for comparisons to skilled workers, like stonemasons or other tradesmen.11 The
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year 1460 is a good cutoff point for examining unskilled manual laborers in the Quattrocento because
after this point, wages reflect a slow return to pre-1348 numbers.12
However, this increase in wages was not limited to that of unskilled, non-guild workers. Skilled
workers also saw their wages increase and laborers, in general, did not have to work as much as they
previously had to because of the access to higher wages.13 This supports Goldthwaite’s claim that, from
the time of the plague’s appearance in Florence in 1348 to around 1460, workers were generally better off
than they had been previously.14 Discussing the fiscal reality of the other parts of society is important
because not only does it contextualize the wealth of the plutocratic members, but also various factors in
an economic system are often related to one another.
Another contributing factor to Florence’s economic situation during the fifteenth century was the
“unprecedented military activity” that ravaged the Italian peninsula from 1350 to 1450.15 One military
conflict on its own can disrupt the normal patterns of an economic environment, let alone multiple
conflicts like Florence’s war with Pisa (1362–1364) or the four clashes with Milan that Florence had
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during this hundred-year period.16 Florentine politicians like Marchionne di Coppo Stefani thought about
the concept of war in economic terms. It is important to note that war has a negative effect on the
economy not only because of the cost of the undertaking but the adverse effect it has on trade markets.17
On the other hand, if a city-state won a conflict, it could see positive economic consequences like the
“indemnity of 100,000 florins” that Florence received in 1364 after their conflict with Pisa.18 To put this
amount into perspective, 100,000 florins is “greater than the capital formation of the Medici bank in its
heyday,” and higher than the estimated yearly revenue for the city of Pisa at the time.19 This period of
increased military activity went beyond territorial concerns and became economic actions that could
provide a great advantage to a city-state or a great financial loss. While there are certainly plenty of
financial repercussions from these conflicts, there were those in Italian society that benefitted. For
instance, merchants in the cloth industry gained wealth from the soldiers buying their products, and
bankers could collect fees for “transferring soldiers’ money home by means of bills of exchange.”20
This concentration of wealth that the elites of Florence gained from military conflicts was only
compounded by international factors like commercial trade. Certain wealthy parties, like the guilds and
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merchants, were able to take advantage of the fact that “more money was being spent on luxury goods”
during this period because of the wage increase, the greater consumer culture, and the population
decrease.21 While the term consumer culture might be traditionally applied to more modern history, the
nature of the Florentine consumers purchasing of luxury goods as part of a larger societal trend means it is
a useful consideration. This trend is illustrated in the overall optimism that Florence had about their
current economic situation, which had improved since the fourteenth century.22 A large part of this system
of wealth accumulation was the city-state’s relationship with the Middle East. During the early part of the
fifteenth century, Florence developed networks that exchanged goods with the Levant on the eastern
border of the Mediterranean.23 The establishment of this mutually beneficial commercial network allowed
for merchants to not only have a supply of the materials needed to create luxury goods but also a market
where domestic goods like woolen textiles could be traded.24 The international mercantile market
contributed to the economic environment that often benefited the wealthy. Given the right set of
circumstances, elite individuals had the opportunity to amass great wealth during the Quattrocento.
The question becomes, who were these elite individuals that amassed such wealth in this
economic climate during the Quattrocento? Many of these individuals who were involved in mercantile
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endeavors were also involved in the banking industry of Florence. This can make distinguishing the two
separate enterprises difficult. Because individuals within the fifteenth-century Florentine banking industry
had such immense wealth and influence in society, they should be examined in detail. The banchi grossi,
the largest banking enterprises in fifteenth-century Florence, “were traders as well as bankers” who dealt
with manners of international trade in addition to their other financial interests.25 This trade involved the
thriving textile industry in Florence, as well as “trade in bills of exchange (cambium per literas),” which
would settle international trade accounts in these mercantile ventures.26
It is important to give examples of the economic elite to be able to determine the composition of
the group as a whole. One such family that fits the model of wealthy merchant bankers with diversified
financial interests and societal influence was the Strozzi. Analysis of the primary line of the family tree
headed by Simone di Filippo di Leonardo Strozzi (d. 1424) clearly shows that a family-owned wool
manufacturing company provided considerable wealth to the family and remained a source of wealth for
the Strozzi throughout the fifteenth century.27 For instance, Simone received “a share of 1,000 florins”
from the capital of the company in 1398.28 When this is considered with the family’s other sources of
income, their overall wealth becomes apparent. These included “insurance contracts” on the protection of
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shipped goods as well as international commercial endeavors and “banking activities” that made the
family one of the wealthiest in fifteenth-century Florence.29 An example of their wealth can be seen in the
Catasto of 1427. In 1427, Matteo di Simone Strozzi had a total net worth of 5,614 florins, which when
compared to the mean net worth of 325 florins (among those who had assessed wealth), demonstrates the
family’s great wealth.30 The Strozzi family’s wealth is even further highlighted by the individual with the
greatest wealth recorded on the Catasto of 1427, Palla Nofri Strozzi (1372–1462), whose total net worth
was recorded as 162,906 florins.31
However, this wealth grew even further under Filippo di Matteo Strozzi. Between 1471 and 1492,
Filippo amassed 116, 255 florins (starting with 31, 649 in 1471) through his various business dealings,
taking into account not only his personal property but all of his assets.32 It should be noted that roughly
“half of Filippo’s estate—52,428 florins—was in cash.”33 Access to large amounts of liquid assets
illustrates the level of wealth the Strozzi achieved: access to liquid assets shows that their finances were
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flexible and could be reinvested fairly easily. This wealth was also in the hands of an individual with
powerful connections to political figures that gave him considerable influence in fifteenth-century
Florence. Filippo “gained considerable influence at the court of King Ferdinand I (1423–1494)” of Naples
by lending Ferdinand money, which allowed him to aid Lorenzo de’ Medici when Florence had a dispute
with the Kingdom of Naples.34 Having such substantial wealth, as well as access to political operatives,
supports the claim that those among the Florentine economic elite influenced the political process because
of their wealth.
Another example of a family among the economic elite of Florence during the fifteenth century
was the Guicciardini. As one of the preeminent families in the history of early modern Florence, the
Guicciardini used their great wealth (in part gained from silk manufacturing) to project political power
and prosperity in the form of a towered residence in the Oltrarno section of the city.35 Symbols of
traditional aristocratic power like a towered residence also provided an illustration of the great wealth that
accompanied their political power. Another symbol of aristocratic power the Guicciardini displayed was
large palazzos, like the one Jacopo di Piero Guicciardini (1422–1490) purchased in 1482 near the area
where “his family had traditionally resided.”36 The abundance of financial assets in the Guicciardini
family is clearly presented in the records of the Catasto of 1427.37 This extensive level of wealth needs to
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be put in context to the rest of the 1427 Florentine tax records. In comparison to the mean net worth of
only 325 florins, and even to someone in the elite like Matteo di Simone Strozzi with a net worth of 5,614
florins, this wealth is staggering by comparison. Among the tax records for that year, only “137
households in Florence (1.4%)” were assessed at or above the net worth level of these members
Guicciardini family.38 While other members of the family did not achieve that level of wealth, the
Guicciardini was still considered to be in the upper bracket of the Florentine economy because their
income was above 1,305 florins.39 The Catasto of 1427 divided the citizens assessed into quintiles based
on the total wealth. Of the 8,349 households with wealth, “the lowest quintile had 1–65 florins”, the
second quintile ranged from 66–103 florins, the third quintile ranged from 204–501 florins, the fourth
quintile ranged from 502–1,304 florins, and the last quintile ranged from 1,305–162,906 florins.40
Another characteristic of this family was their heavy involvement in Florentine politics
throughout the fifteenth century. This participation in politics is illustrated by the extensive political
career of Luigi di Piero Guicciardini (1407–1487) who held many different offices from 1437 to 1487.41
These offices included podestà of Milan (1449–1451), Gonfaloniere di Giustizia (1457), membership in
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the balìa (1452), and accoppiatore (1475).42 However impressive this prolific political resume may be,
the Guicciardini did not exert their political power as well as the Medici. As discussed in the chapter on
politics, the Medici family were able to amass immense political control over the Republic of Florence.
For example, Cosimo was in control of the Florentine political landscape after his rise to power in 1434.43
However, both Luigi di Piero Guicciardini and his brother Jacopo di Piero Guicciardini served in
governmental positions that the Medici controlled.44 Ultimately, the Medici were able to translate their
wealth into political power more effectively than any other member wealthy family in Florence, including
the Guicciardini.
The patterns of wealth among the fifteenth-century economic elite allow us to understand patterns
within the larger Florentine economy. For example, the financial records of the Gondi and Capponi
mercantile families in fifteenth-century Florence show a marked increase in their wealth. In the Catasto of
1427, Leonardo di Leonardo di Simone Gondi (1400–1449) had an assessed wealth of 1,831 florins.45 A
member of the same family, Giuliano di Leonardo (1421–1501), had one workshop worth 4,000 florins
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(1457).46 While this is not indicative of every member of the Gondi family, it does illustrate an increase of
wealth among Florentine elites during the fifteenth century. The same pattern can be seen from a son and
father of the Capponi family who, in 1427 and 1457 respectively, saw an increase of total wealth from
6,720 florins to 14,489 florins.47 This trend not only further illustrates the wealth of the families that
constituted the economic elite but also demonstrates an increase in wealth among elite families between
1420 and 1460.
The question then arises, why would these wealthy individuals seek to gain positions in the
Florentine government? It should be noted that the desire to hold political office was not entirely
financially motivated. A traditional patrician family like the Guicciardini seemed to have a sense of
noblesse oblige (responsibility of the aristocracy to the lower classes) towards the city of Florence.48 The
prestige and power that political offices offered also contributed to the desire of the wealthy to seek
political office.49 However, there were opportunities to acquire wealth via governmental positions in the
fifteenth-century Florentine government. There are examples of such personal enrichment, but this
particular area of research is surprisingly sparse of specific instances. There needs to be further
exploration of this topic by the academic community like Richard Goldthwaite attempted to do in his
work The Economy of Renaissance Florence.50 However, more historians who study Florentine political
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history, like John M. Najemy and Nicholas Scott Baker, need to examine this area of research because of
how impactful these economic factors were on political matters.
It should be noted that governmental positions often offered salaries for performing the duties of
the office itself. For instance, in 1483, Lorenzo de’ Medici held the position of Chamberlain of Naples,
which earned him “lucrative emoluments” or payments.51 The potential payments for these types of
positions had to be massive to be lucrative and advantageous for Lorenzo de’ Medici. Certain political
offices had designated salaries, but particular positions were more sought after because of their potential
for “additional profits by rendering special services and collecting commissions on fines.”52 Aside from
direct financial benefits, an individual in such a position could garner business for their private
enterprises. The Medici family were able to use their roles as Florentine diplomats to advertise their banks
in other Italian city-states like Rome and Milan.53 While these actions provided the Medici with a
financial advantage, some members of the ruling elite did not find governmental offices as lucrative. For
example, Neri Capponi (1388–1457) seems to have chosen to invest his wealth in projects that did not
require “vigilant attention” because his service on the Medicean led balia took up too much of his time.54
At least in this specific instance, political commitments could limit the amount of wealth a plutocratic
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elite could amass. The case of Neri Capponi also highlights the Medici’s ability to more successfully
acquire money through their political positions than other families like the Capponi.
The fifteenth-century Florentine family among the economic elite that influenced and
manipulated the Republic of Florence most effectively was the Medici. The family’s history as merchant
bankers can be traced back to the thirteenth century and the Medici gained “considerable wealth” in
Florentine society by the fourteenth century.55 Like many of the families among the economic elite, the
Medici had multiple means of accumulating wealth. For instance, the Medici family were “partners” in
“silk and woolen industries in Florence” and had connections to the guilds that controlled these
industries.56 However, the entity that proved most profitable for the family was the Medici Bank that was
founded in 1397 by Giovanni di Bicci de’ Medici (1360–1429).57 This banking business was structured to
minimize the financial risk to the family while maintaining profitability.
Each branch of the bank “was a separate legal” entity whose profit would funnel to the main
branch of the bank so that the overall business would not suffer greatly if a particular branch failed.58 In
other terms, the bank was run using “partnership agreements” that place the onus on the junior partner to
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correctly administer the bank branch, while the “senior partners retained all the power.”59 This banking
empire, whose system is similar to that of a limited liability company, allowed the Medici to amass
substantial wealth as well as maintain a large amount of control over the bank. They did this through
several means of control, including retaining the ability to remove branch managers from their position
and “owning at least 50 per cent of the capital.”60 According to the Catasto of 1427, Giovanni di Bicci de’
Medici’s total assessed worth was 91,089 florins, which put him in the top 1.4% among the heads of
households in Florence.61
Under Cosimo de’ Medici, the Medici Bank would maintain the structure and administration
implemented by his father Giovanni di Bicci de’ Medici. This administrative style allowed the bank to
reach its apex in scope and profitability under Cosimo, coinciding with the family’s ascent in political
power.62 There were many factors that led to the bank reaching such prominence under Cosimo’s
administration. Unlike the administration of the bank under Lorenzo, Cosimo “maintained close control
over the management” of the entire enterprise.63 His attention to detail in the directing of the Medici Bank
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greatly benefited the business. One major factor that explains the bank’s rise was gaining the papacy as a
banking client, thanks to the ascension of John XXIII (Baldassarre Cossa; 1370–1419), regarded by the
Catholics as an Antipope, in May of 1410. Cossa’s connection to the Medici was an “old friendship” with
Giovanni.64 This relationship, which was the catalyst that allowed the Medici Bank to handle the money
of the papacy, illustrates the access that the wealthy had in fifteenth-century Florence. Had the Medici not
been able to lend the then cardinal money (a cardinal whose title they might have bought in 1402), they
would not have been in such a position to become the papal bankers in 1410.65
The working association the Medici secured with the papacy helped ensure the financial
successes seen under Cosimo. The papal account meant that the Medici Bank would be managing
accounts of tens of thousands of florins (which increased their commission) and during Cosimo de’
Medici’s administrative reign over the bank, the “branch at the Curia was the most profitable” of his
various business dealings.66 For instance, between 1420 and 1435, the papal account represented “63
percent of all profits” made on an international basis and supplied aid to other branches of the Medici
Bank who “encountered problems.”67 For a wealthy family with a thriving banking business, the most
profitable account of that business needs to provide substantial wealth to the venture. This provides
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context into the massive monetary gain the papal bankers offered. The “fortune in papal business” was
comprised of not only managing the papal accounts but also establishing “an important base for” textile
trade.68 Despite the wealth the papacy afforded the banking family, the diversified financial interests of
the merchant banker applied to the Medici family as well.
These families constituted a clear economic elite within Florence. Did they then use that wealth
to influence their society? In other words, was Florence in the Quattrocento truly a plutocracy controlled
by a small group of extraordinarily rich families? The Medici were able to exert more influence than
families like the Guicciardini because they used their money more effectively in the purchasing of
political and societal influence. The political power both Luigi di Piero Guicciardini and Jacopo di Piero
Guicciardini attained did not surpass the Medici’s political influence in Florence. However, the Medici’s
superiority in purchasing societal influence is not limited to the Florentine political realm. For example,
the Medici used their wealth, accrued largely from their banking enterprise, to purchase power in the
religious sphere of Florentine society. The Medici aimed at “cultivating clients within the Florentine
church” through various methods, including patronage to increase “their influence and prestige.”69
Because the Catholic Church was so important to the fabric of Florentine society, exerting dominance in
the religious sphere along with the family’s dominance over the government, would mean greater overall
influence. The Medici’s desire to enter into the religious sphere by using their family’s wealth manifested
itself in surprising ways. For instance, because the Medici were the bankers of the papacy, formal papal
bulls of episcopal appointments went through the bank’s infrastructure so the prospective member could
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pay the Medici the “dues” the candidate owed.70 The prospective candidate would have to pay these dues
or fees to the church in order to get a position such as bishop, which went through the Medici Bank
during their tenure as the papal bankers.71 This system allowed for the preferential treatment of certain
individuals. For instance, the Medici allowed Thomas Kemp to pay his fees in London before another
individual who had the backing of the King of England, aiding him in securing the bishopric of London in
1448.72 This incident illustrates how the wealth of the Medici banking family had enough influence to
help decide a seat of religious power in another country.
Incidents like the Kemp case in London could also be seen in Tuscany during the fifteenth
century. When Cosimo was head of the family, his distant relative, Filippo de’ Medici (1426–1474) was
appointed bishop of Arezzo in 1457 and archbishop of Pisa in 1461.73 If the Medici family under Cosimo
was willing to secure a religious position for a non-relative in another country, the notion that they would
do the same for a member of the Medici is easy to believe. The involvement of Cosimo in this selection
becomes more probable when it is revealed that he wanted his relative to obtain the bishopric in the
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Tuscan city of Arezzo, despite Filippo’s inability to obtain the appointment.74 While the political
influence of Cosimo in Florence during this time cannot be discounted, the Medici family’s wealth and
patronage of the church were also at play in the city of Arezzo.
Another instance of the Medici family attempting to use their wealth to insert a family member in
a prominent church position occurred in Florence in 1445. What the Medici understood about Florence
was that the wealthy governed the poor and this religious position offered the family an additional “sphere
of authority.”75 With that sentiment in mind, Cosimo lobbied the Pope Eugenius IV (1382–1447—r.
1431–47) to get his “his second cousin, Donato de’ Medici” appointed to the archbishopric of Florence.76
Taking into account that the Medici were papal bankers, their wealth and banking empire played a role in
the pope’s considerations of possibly placing the Medici clergyman in the position of archbishop. Also,
after the Council of Basel deposed Pope Eugenius IV on January 25, 1439, Cosimo was the pope’s
“Florentine host.”77 This personal relationship could have offered Cosimo a more advantageous

74

Robert Black, “Arezzo, the Medici and the Florentine regime,” in Florentine Tuscany:

Structures and Practices of Power, eds. William J. Connell and Andrea Zorzi (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2000), 297.

75

David Spencer Peterson, “Archbishop Antoninus: Florence and the Church in the Earlier

Fifteenth-century (Italy),” (PhD diss., Cornell University, 1985), 39.

76

Ibid., 40.

77

Riccardo Fubini, and Sarah-Louise Raillard, “Cosimo De’ Medici’s Regime: His Rise to Power

(1434),” Revue Française De Science Politique (English Edition) 64, no. 6 (2014): 81, accessed March
11, 2020.

77
negotiating position. While this attempt at influencing the choice through economic pressure failed when
St. Antonio Forcilioni or Antonino Pierozzi (1389–1459) was made the Archbishop of Firenze in 1446,
one of the new archbishop’s “Principal Co-Consecrators” (those assisting in the special ceremonial
consecration for that particular individual) was, in fact, Donato de’ Medici.78 While the intended goal of
getting a Medici in the seat of Archbishop of Firenze was not fully successful, the authority and
legitimacy that the office offered were at least associated with the banking family. Within the Catholic
Church, the consecration of an official church position like archbishop is a recognition of one’s
authority.79
During the fifteenth century, Florence had a unique economic environment that allowed the
economic elite of the city-state to thrive and exert great influence over society. The characteristics of this
economic ruling class take shape through analysis of tax records and accounts on the affluence of certain
families. This economic environment was made possible, in part, because of the dramatic demographic
change in Florence caused by the Black Death as well as the constant warfare that characterized the
fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. The decrease in population led to an increase in wages for a large
portion of the city’s workforce. Increased wages for fewer days of work allowed these individuals to
purchase luxury goods that the economic elite (merchant bankers) trafficked in. As Richard Goldthwaite
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surmised in Private Wealth in Renaissance Florence: A Study of Four Families, “the prosperity in
Florence had always been rooted in business.”80
The elite group of merchant bankers not only traded goods on an international level but also
participated in the banking industry. These often-intertwined financial enterprises can explain the great
wealth disparity the Catasto of 1427 illustrates. Families like the Strozzi, Guicciardini, and others
reinforced the notion of income inequality in the Florentine Quattrocento and helped shape the plutocratic
ruling class. The Medici exemplified a wealthy family that was not only a part of the plutocracy of
Florence but also a family that was able to exercise their influence over society. The Medici’s “enormous
wealth” and societal influence can be tied heavily to their banking empire, which supported their
dominance over Florence during much of the fifteenth century.81 Their wielding of economic influence is
demonstrated in the Medici’s attempts to use the financial power to manipulate the appointment of
religious positions. The totality of the Medici family’s economic history during the Quattrocento
illustrates how a plutocracy can acquire wealth and use it to gain societal authority outside of political
control. Along with the examples of other wealthy merchant banker families, this explains how the
plutocracy that presided over the Republic of Florence attained and used wealth during the fifteenth
century.
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION
During the fifteenth century, the Republic of Florence was governed under plutocratic rule and in
control of this plutocracy was the Medici banking family. The notion that a plutocracy, in which a few
wealthy individuals controlled Florence, existed under the guise of a republic demonstrates the
vulnerabilities of the fifteenth-century Florentine system of government. Further analysis of Florence’s
political situation during the Quattrocento and the methods the Medici family used to secure their political
dominance, details how these vulnerabilities were manipulated. Informed by the events of the workers’
rebellion known as Ciompi Revolt (1378–1382), this political reality led to the Florentine government
being controlled by a small group of elite citizens.1 This limited pool of electable government officials
offered an immense opportunity for such elite individuals to influence Florence during the Quattrocento.
The preeminent family among the plutocracy that reigned over Florence was the Medici.
This Medici application of plutocratic control over the Republic of Florence began with Cosimo
de’ Medici’s ascension to political power in 1434.2 While the family’s consolidation of power consisted
of tangible political appointments, it was also greatly aided by their employment of civic humanist
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literature and other artistic endeavors.3 This use of art and civic humanist philosophy allowed the Medici
family to expand their level of control throughout Florentine society during the fifteenth century. The
Medici were firmly established among the plutocratic ruling class of Florence with the vast financial
wealth their family accumulated through their international banking enterprise (as seen in the Catasto of
1427).4
As chapter two demonstrated, the Medici’s appropriation of civic humanist literature, like that of
Leonardo Bruni, was used to justify the family’s plutocratic style of rule. Bruni’s interpretation of
Florentine history was so well-liked by the Medici, that Cosimo kept a copy of History of the Florentine
People (1442) “among his most precious books.”5 There was a clear association between the two parties
and a concerted attempt on Bruni’s part to achieve a favorability with the Medici regime. This can be
inferred by reading Bruni’s dedication in his Latin translation of Economics (1420) and his use of the
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Medici Bank’s services.6 By using this historical record to put their style of rule in a favorable light, the
family legitimized their reign through the authority of Bruni’s work. However, this was not the only
means by which the family was able to project their authority in Florence.
Both Cosimo and Lorenzo de’ Medici were able to use their vast patronage networks to acquire
various forms of art to project the family’s socio-political power. Their patronage included massive
architectural projects like the Medici palace built by Cosimo and the Poggio a Caiano villa built by
Lorenzo.7 These massive building projects offered an opportunity to covey the power and prestige that the
Medici obtained through their ascension of the Florentine plutocracy. Not only did the sheer scale of these
structures convey the family’s power to any citizen that laid eyes on it, but those special individuals who
witnessed the inside of the residences were treated to a unique display of power. For example, the
audience Cosimo held at the chapel within the Medici palace illustrated this private projection of power.8
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The evidence in chapter three supported the claim that the Republic of Florence’s systems of
government during the Quattrocento did not adequately protect the integrity of the Florentine constitution,
and the primary party responsible for this manipulation was the Medici. The Medici controlled Florentine
government, particularly under Cosimo, and was able to exploit the governmental procedures that were
not robust enough to prevent such manipulation. For example, the practice of sortition to elect
government officials was exploited by the Medici because the process was easily susceptible to
tampering.9 These manipulations of the electoral processes during the fifteenth century helped amass and
maintain the Medici control over the Florentine political landscape.
Many aspects of both Cosimo and Lorenzo’s actions were anti-republican in nature and further
contributed to the assertion that a fifteenth-century Florentine plutocracy existed. One such behavior the
Medici exhibited throughout the Quattrocento that supports this assertion was the filling of government
offices with partisans who would manipulate the Republic of Florence’s republican processes.10 This
allowed the Medici’s plutocratic control over Florence to appear republican in nature while the banking
family was still able to maintain immense control over the Florentine government. The Tratte of Office
Holders showed that the Medici themselves also maintained a large presence in the offices of the
Florentine government during much of the fifteenth century.11 The family’s successful plutocratic reign
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over the Republic of Florence also exploited the power that the majority holds in a representative
government.
The fourth chapter demonstrated not only who comprised the plutocracy of Florence but how the
most influential family in the plutocracy, the Medici, used their wealth to facilitate their political
dominance and garner control in Florence’s religious domain. Through the examination of tax records and
sources such as Richard Goldthwaite’s Private Wealth in Renaissance Florence: A Study of Four
Families, the plutocratic characteristics of fifteenth-century Florence take shape.12 While the more
traditional aristocrats of Europe were not as “amorphous” a group as the Florentine ruling class, the
chapter on economics effectively illustrates the financial characteristics of the plutocracy.13
Although the sources studied in this thesis show that the Medici were not the wealthiest among
the economic elite, the overall argument demonstrates that the Medici proved the most adept at using their
wealth to obtain socio-political power. Another example of how the Medici effectively transformed their
wealth into power within Florentine society is their involvement in the religious sphere. Understanding
the level of influence the church had in society during the fifteenth century spurred the Medici to use their
connections as papal bankers to manipulate the appointment of religious officials in the Catholic
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Church.14 These attempts to intervene in the affairs of the church illustrate yet another way the Medici
sought to accumulate more control and influence over Florentine society. The repeated efforts to
accomplish this goal, as demonstrated in the overall work, is one reason why this banking family was able
to rule the Republic of Florence for a large part of the Quattrocento.
Given the totality of the evidence that this work presents, the Medici family were able to rule the
Florentine plutocracy because of their great wealth, their political deployment of the arts and civic
humanist literature, and their ability to exploit the political institutions of the Republic of Florence.
Nevertheless, their success cannot be entirely attributed to circumstances. The Medici family during the
Quattrocento did not succeed without skilled leadership. Cosimo was able to take the Medici Bank that
his father started, and lead the enterprise to the most profitable time in its history.15 Both he and Lorenzo
were able therefore to effectively put their vast wealth to work in manipulating the Republic of Florence
in order to amass political power by, among other things, tampering with the election processes.16
These were not the actions of unskilled political operatives who lack skill and experience.
However, it was not with skill alone that the Medici became the most important family in fifteenthcentury Florence. In Machiavellian terms, the Medici were able to exercise their virtù in ways similar to

14

George Holmes, “How the Medici Became the Pope’s Bankers,” in Florentine Studies: Politics

and Society in Renaissance Florence, ed. Nicolai Rubinstein (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University
Press, 1968).

15

Ady, Lorenzo Dei Medici and Renaissance Italy, 36.

16

Rubinstein, The Government of Florence Under the Medici: (1434 to 1494), 205, 207.

85
that of Cesare Borgia in Chapter VII of the Prince (1513).17 While these descriptions of the Medici were
on some level designed to ingratiate Machiavelli to the new leaders of the family, the events of the
Medici’s political dominance can be effectively analyzed by the terminology of the Prince. Throughout
their reign over Florence, the Medici found themselves in situations with favorable Fortuna and took
advantage of it. Certain situations, such as Lorenzo’s success after the death of his father Piero de’
Medici, illustrated the Machiavellian idea that someone with enough virtù “could overcome the
destabilizing power of fortune.”18 The Medici’s ability had a role in their success but it still cannot
entirely account for their plutocracy that ruled over the Republic of Florence during the Quattrocento.
While it is important to acknowledge the ability of the Medici family in social, economic, and political
arenas, factors outside of their control contributed to their overall success atop the Florentine plutocracy.
As the overall work has shown, the Medici family were the most adept members of the plutocratic ruling
class at amassing power with fifteenth-century Florentine society.
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